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SUMMARY
In this paper, precedents are analysed in terms of reasons that they can give to judges in various 
legal systems, with the purpose of identifying the ways in which precedents can be authoritative in 
judicial reasoning. The analysis starts with the distinction between two kinds of precedents – pre-
cedents of solution and precedents of interpretation. The ways in which both precedents of solution 
and precedents of interpretation affect the reasoning of future courts are identified and described, in 
order to focus on instances in which this affection can be considered practically and epistemically 
authoritative. Finally, conditions for considering under which it can be justified to treat precedents 
as authoritative are laid down, with a special emphasis on the possibility of justifying the epistemic 
authority of interpretative precedents.
Keywords: precedent; authority of precedents; precedential practice; epistemic authority; practical 
authority
[W]e do not write on a clean slate2.
1 I’m grateful to Ken Himma for insightful and detailed comments on the draft of the paper, as 
well as to participants in the workshop Potential of Precedent in the Statutory Legal Order. Context 
of Political and Legal Discourse, organized by Leszek Leszczyński and Adam Szot as a part of the 
“XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Phi-
losophy” (IVR). The opportunity for engaging the topic of the paper was provided by the Alexander 
von Humboldt Foundation scholarship for research on the Institute for public law, constitutional law 
and philosophy of law under the supervision of Martin Borowski. This paper is a result of the work on 
the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law project “Transformation of Identity of Serbia” in 2018.
2 Miller v. Fenton et al. 474 U.S. 104 (1985). The quote and the judgement figure prominently 
in the paper on precedents by Gerald Postema. See: G.J. Postema, On the Moral Presence of Our 
Past, “McGill Law Journal” 1991, Vol. 36(4), pp. 1153–1221.
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REASONING WITH PRECEDENTS
There are at least two ways in which we talk about precedents in legal theory 
and philosophy. Sometimes, in what is thought to be technical legal usage of the 
term, we say that precedents are judicial decisions that either establish or exemplify 
a norm of conduct that is binding for courts in future cases. Other times, we use the 
word ‘precedent’ to denote any past decision that is in any way, covertly or overtly, 
used to decide similar issues in the present and future cases.
When we refer to precedents in the first, technical, sense of the word we are 
commonly talking about the idea of formal sources of law and the doctrine of stare 
decisis. From a civil-law perspective, we are, in general terms describing the fact 
that for the most part, in civil-law legal systems, previous judicial decisions are 
not, as a matter of law, binding for future judicial decisions3. We then contrast this 
tradition with the common law tradition in which the precedents are binding as 
a matter of law.
While it might be argued that this rough picture that relies on a crude notion 
of sources of law, and a reductive view about precedents, this very picture is quite 
dominant in continental legal theory. And indeed, it reflects an important insight 
about the authority of precedents in common law systems – being formal sources 
of law precedents are not simply illustrative, but actually, bind the authoritative 
legal interpreters on future occasions.
Already at the end of the last century, a major study of the role of precedents 
in legal systems convincingly concluded that “precedent now plays a significant 
part in legal decision making and in the development of law […] whether or not 
precedent is officially recognized as formally binding”4. In fact, many constitu-
tions nowadays contain explicit norms that prescribe previous judicial decisions 
as sources of law, which makes precedents formally binding in civil-law systems. 
Insofar as it is still common to claim that precedents are most often thought to have 
persuasive strength at best, and not legal authority5, the common claim is wrong6.
3 This makes even talking about precedent in a nontechnical fashion quite problematic. The 
very mentioning of the word “precedent” in the context of civil law systems, often provokes an un-
reasonable negative reaction. Given the strong tendency toward the idea that legislative bodies are 
the sole creators of law, this attitude is somewhat understandable, but definitely not justifiable.
4 N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, [in:] Inter-
preting Precedents, eds. N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Routledge, 1997, pp. 531–532.
5 N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 13.
6 Or, as Anthony Kronman writes: “Respect for past decisions, for precedent, is not a char-
acteristic of certain legal systems only. It is rather a feature of law in general, and wherever there 
exists a set of practices and institutions that we believe are entitled to the name of law, the rule of 
precedent will be at work, influencing, to one degree or another, the conduct of those responsible 
for administering the practices and institutions in question”. See: A.T. Kronman, Precedent and 
Tradition, “The Yale Law Journal” 1990, Vol. 99, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/796595, p. 1032. We 
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This reductive use of the term “precedent” to refer just to formally binding 
judicial decisions is somewhat unjustified. Basing an instance of reasoning on 
a previous instance of reasoning in a same or similar is not a specificity of legal 
reasoning. We often treat our previous behaviours as reasons for acting the same 
way in the same situations in the future7. In common parlance, and in most of the 
common law legal theory and philosophy of law, the word ‘precedent’ is taken to 
mean “something done or said that may serve as an example or rule to authorize 
or justify a subsequent act of the same or an analogous kind” or “the convention 
established by such a precedent or by long practice”8.
This dictionary definition can be, and often is, framed with more precision. First 
of all, the common definition implies that reasoning with precedents is not a form 
of reasoning confined to courts and other state officials. Every time that we make 
a claim that we have a reason for deciding X in the case A, because X was decided 
when A occurred previously, we are in fact reasoning with precedents. To say that 
we acted in the way X in the situation A, because we did so previously, is to say 
that the previous act gives us a reason for acting now9. Quite obviously, this form 
of reasoning is not confined to common-law courts but is a significant part of legal 
reasoning of any court. In this common sense of the word, precedents are considered 
to be simply “prior decisions that serve as a model for future decisions”10. From 
this perspective, the technical meaning of the word ‘precedent’ is just a special case 
of the common meaning of the word ‘precedent’. In fact, having a system of law 
in which precedents are formal sources of law amounts to the fact that judges are 
obligated to decide X in cases A, because of earlier decisions X in the case A. In 
other words, in those systems precedents give judges legal reasons to decide cases.
Both meanings of the word ‘precedent’ give rise to interesting and important 
issues in theory and philosophy of law. In this paper I’ll, however, be primarily 
concerned with framing the role of precedents in terms of reasons that they can give 
to judges in various legal systems. The main purpose of this paper is to identify 
the ways in which precedents can be authoritative in judicial reasoning. First, I’ll 
explain the distinction between two kinds of precedents – precedents of solution 
and precedents of interpretation. Second, I’ll identify the ways in which both pre-
could still, of course, hold the view that the use of precedents in civil-law countries is not justified 
from a certain point of view.
7 Frederick Schauer notes that “reliance on precedent is part of life in general”. See: F. Schauer, 
Precedent, “Stanford Law Review” 1987, Vol. 39(3), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1228760, p. 571.
8 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent [access: 
10.02.2018]. Larry Alexander calls this intuitive idea that previous decisions are naturally given 
a weight in present reasoning “the natural model of precedent”. See: L. Alexander, Constrained by 
Precedent, “Southern California Law Review” 1989, Vol. 63(1), p. 5.
9 F. Schauer, Precedent, p. 571.
10 N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers, Introduction, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, p. 1.
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cedents of solution and precedents of interpretation affect the reasoning of future 
courts, and focus on the cases in which this affection can be considered practically 
and epistemically authoritative. Finally, I’ll consider the conditions under which it 
can be epistemically justified to treat precedents as authoritative, with an emphasis 
on the possibility of justifying the epistemic authority of interpretative precedents.
PRECEDENTS OF SOLUTION AND PRECEDENTS OF INTERPRETATION
The decision-making process of courts is not confined to deciding the case at 
hand, but also involves deciding issues of interpretation of texts and qualification 
of facts. Whenever a multiplicity of meanings can be ascribed to a legal text the 
task of adjudicative interpretation is to reach a decision about the meaning of the 
legal text. Adjudicating officials are supposed to settle the interpretative question; 
they are expected to ascribe a definite meaning to the legal text. Serving as a mo-
del could then mean at least two things that are relevant for our present purposes:
1. The facts of a case under litigation could be the same or similar in impor-
tant ways11 with the facts of a case that was already decided. If the former 
obtains in a legal system in which precedents are formal sources of law12, 
a previous judicial decision serves as a model in the sense that it obligates 
the court to solve the case in question according to the precedent. In a long 
tradition of thinking about precedents common law theoretical and practical 
jurisprudence commonly identifies the binding element of previous decisions 
calling it ratio decidendi and distinguishing it from orbiter dicta13. What 
is binding in a previous judicial decision that has the status of precedent is 
the rule of law that is being laid down or followed by the court setting the 
11 The meaning of appropriate is of course subject to much contention. The word used in Serbian 
theoretical jurisprudence is “essentially similar”. Robert S. Summers uses the term “appropriately 
similar”. See: R.S. Summers, Departures from Precedents, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, p. 520.
12 There is a lot to be said about the idea of a source of law. A clarification of sources of law 
not resting on this formalist premise leaves more breading room for precedents. Alexander Peczenik 
talks about three kinds of legal sources: “must sources”, “should sources” and “may sources”. “Must 
sources” are formally or de iure binding. “Should sources” are the texts that a judge is to take into 
account in his reasoning but he is not obligated to do so. “May sources” are additional materials that 
judge may or may not use in his reasoning aimed at reaching the decision (see: A. Peczenik, Scientia 
Juris: Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law, Springer Publishing, 2005, 
pp. 16–17). From this perspective precedents in civil-law countries are most often either should 
sources or may sources of law. It will become clear later on that they are, in a certain sense, also must 
sources in many contemporary civil-law jurisdictions.
13 This view is however far from uncontroversial. Larry Alexander notes that “if one were to 
ask law students, lawyers, judges, or legal academics what following precedent entails, one would 
almost surely get a variety of inconsistent answers”. See: L. Alexander, op. cit., p. 3.
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precedent. The other parts of the precedent can have a significant amount 
of persuasive quality, but they are often not considered formally binding14. 
Whenever we talk about precedent in civil law we tend to have in mind this 
common law model of precedents that I’ll call “precedents of solution”15. 
In setting, precedents of solution courts lay down a rule of law, and their 
function is in significant ways legislative and creative.
2. When a previous decision is used in future decisions this doesn’t necessarily 
have to do with similarity or sameness of facts that require a legal solution. 
General legal provisions do not solve cases. Courts, especially higher courts 
in contemporary legal systems, decide on the meaning of statutory words 
and provisions. Consequently, the previous judicial decision can serve as 
a model in the sense that we follow them in reaching interpretative decisions 
based on the similarity or sameness of statutory and constitutional texts 
that are employed in resolving the case. No matter the importance that we 
ascribe to courts in relation to the legislator, it is certain that solving cases 
necessarily requires some interpretative work on the part of the courts. 
Often, the result of the interpretative work is a decision about the meaning 
of a legal provision. If this is so, then previous judicial decisions lay down an 
interpretation of existing legal texts that is relevant for future cases in which 
the same statutory or constitutional terms or provisions are applied. When 
this is the case, the precedents are called “precedents of interpretation”16.
In both cases, previous decisions serve as models for future decisions. Pre-
cedents of solution are decisions about a case, and precedents of interpretation 
are decisions about the meaning of a word, a sentence or an entire provision of 
law. There are some significant differences between precedents of solution and 
precedents of interpretation. One of the main tasks that a court has in regards of 
adjudicative precedents is to establish the sameness or similarity of the case before 
him and the case that was authoritatively adjudicated. This analogical reasoning is 
14 It should be noted here that the notion of “formally binding” is somewhat imported from con-
tinental legal thinking to the Anglo-American legal systems. The fact is that the notion of a formally 
binding precedent isn’t introduced in English law by statutory or constitutional proclamation, and 
there is significant uncertainty about when judges started feeling formally bound to follow prece-
dents (see: N. Duxbury, op. cit., pp. 17–18). Bentham and Austin considered precedent to be simply 
a decision in a previous case, confined to that case. As such, they are simple instances or examples 
of the application of a previously existing rule, and not rule-setting (ibidem, pp. 17, 59).
15 M. Troper, Ch. Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, [in:] Interpreting Precedents, p. 126.
16 Ibidem. It is quite interesting to note that precedents were treated in common law jurisdic-
tions as “evidence of common learning” of the entirety of legal profession. In this sense, previous 
decisions were not considered binding as a matter of law, but were mostly regarded as beliefs and 
they eventually gave reasons for believing (N. Duxbury, op. cit., p. 32).
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problematic, and in practice difficult17. This is not so when it comes to interpretative 
precedents. The idea of interpretative precedent encompasses the identity of the text 
interpreted by a previous court and a present court. The process of reasoning with 
interpretative precedents doesn’t necessarily imply an assessment of the similarity 
of facts and is consequently much simpler18. With this in mind, let us turn to an 
analysis of what can it mean to serve as a model in the cases of adjudicative and 
interpretative precedents.
AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENTS
1. Serving as a model
To serve as a model in the context of analysing precedents means that a previous 
decision of a court in a way affects a current decision of a court. Since previous 
decisions can affect future decisions in quite insignificant ways, to claim that so-
mething served as a model is to claim that the subject is affected by the decision in 
a significant manner19. The first mode in which the precedents could affect future 
decision is by way of coercion. Contemporary legal systems for the most part do 
not authorise the use of sanctions for not following precedents in the way in which, 
for example, they authorise sanctions for jaywalking. Furthermore, judges do not 
routinely or often comply with precedents for threat of deprivation, and coercion 
necessarily implies this exact threat. Coercion is thus not a candidate for analysing 
the power of precedents. The second mode in which the precedents could significan-
tly affect current decisions is by way of influence. Influence doesn’t imply a threat 
of deprivation but still leads to a change in agent’s actions or beliefs. Precedents in 
both continental and common law systems can have and often do have significant 
17 One of the problems with precedents of solution it that they are basically, as Frederick Schauer 
puts it, considered a fallacy from the perspective of philosophy. See: F. Schauer, Profiles, probabilities, 
and stereotypes, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 273.
18 This doesn’t mean that the interpretative reasoning is simple under all possible theoretical 
and all imaginable practical conditions. With both precedents of interpretation and precedents of 
solution we could in fact say that a decision in a case or an ascription of meaning is an instantiation 
of a rule (that may or may not be existent prior to the decision). That is indeed the sense in which 
the term is often used in literature. It was noted earlier that in this paper we’ll give more weight to 
the nontechnical meaning of the word precedent of interpretation. This common meaning implies 
that the interpretative decision about the meaning of a legal text that serves as “a model for a future 
interpretative decision” – it is a singular stipulation of meaning that “influences” future interpreta-
tive stipulations, or ascriptions of meaning. This basically means that precedents are understood as 
instantiations of rules, but in precedents as reasons for action or belief.
19 See: S. Lukes, Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-
80257-5, p. 30.
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influence in judicial decision making. Still, influence doesn’t seem well suited to 
explain the fact that precedents are binding, in a sense non-optional, for judges in 
both common law and civil law. When something is a source of law, it is not merely 
considered to be influential in the sense that it is important, but can be disposed 
of. If a precedent is considered to be a source of law, it seems necessary that it 
has authority. Authority as a mode of power implies compliance with a deontic 
proposition for reasons of accepting an affection as legitimate or reasonable from 
the perspective of its content or procedures that brought forward the decision20. In 
the rest of the paper, I’ll mostly discuss the authority of precedents and not simply 
their influence or persuasive strength21.
2. Authority
The most influential conception of authority in law to date is the service con-
ception proposed by Joseph Raz. According to him a proper account of authority 
should be able to explain the role of authoritative directives in our practical re-
asoning22. From the perspective of practical reasoning, authority can be defined as 
a property of an entity X that enables (mostly verbal) behaviours of person X to act 
as reasons23 for a person Y24. We say that X has authority if X is able with verbal 
utterances to change Y’s reasons for doing or believing something25. Authority 
is thus the ability to give rise to new reasons for action or belief or the ability to 
change reasons for action or belief26. We are inclined to say that something or so-
meone is an authority if her expression is able to change our reasons for acting or 
believing, not in virtue of the content of the expression but in virtue of the source 
20 Ibidem, pp. 21–22.
21 This is not to say that the notion of “persuasiveness” is not important for an analysis of 
precedents. Ronald Dworkin argued that we should distinguish between the “enactment force of the 
precedent” and the “gravitational force of the precedent” (see: R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 111). In the part of this paper that explains the practical authority 
of precedents, I’ll mostly be interested in what Dworkin calls enactment force, and in the part of 
the paper that explains epistemic authority of precedents, I’ll be mostly interested in gravitational 
force of precedents. It is just to say that the topic will not be tackled in detail in this paper. Some of 
the contributions and debates about the idea of persuasive influence, and the confused idea of “per-
suasive authority” can be found in the following papers: H.P. Glenu, Persuasive Authority, “McGill 
Law Journal” 1987, Vol. 32(2), pp. 261–298; C. Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 
“Oklahoma Law Review” 2009, Vol. 62(1), pp. 55–88; F. Schauer, Authority and Authorities, “Virginia 
Law Review” 2008, Vol. 94, pp. 1193–1196.
22 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 10.
23 Reasons being facts that “count in favor” of doing or believing something (see: A. Marmor, Social 
Conventions, Princeton University Press, 2009, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831654, p. 5).
24 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 12.
25 Ibidem, p. 19.
26 Ibidem, p. 16.
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of the expression27. To frame it formally: X is an authority if his utterance p can 
change reasons for action or reasons for belief of Y not in virtue of the content of 
p but in virtue of p being uttered by X.
With authority, we reach the idea of “serving as a model” that we are most 
interested in when it comes to precedents – a precedent has authority over judges 
if it gives them content-independent reasons. But what kind of reasons can a pre-
cedent give us? The distinction between various types of reasons in our practical 
reasoning, like reasons for desires, emotions, attitudes, norms, and institutions and 
so on, can in principle be condensed to two fundamental types – reasons for action 
and reasons for belief 28. In light of this distinction, we distinguish two basic kinds 
of authority: practical and epistemic29. According to J. Raz, practical and epistemic 
authority have “the same basic structure”, but that the main difference is that “they 
provide reasons for different things”30 – while practical authority gives reasons for 
action, epistemic authority gives reasons for belief31.
27 F. Schauer, Authority… An important difference that Raz makes in this regard is the difference 
between having authority and being an authority. I could have the authority to use the scanner in my 
Institute without being an authority for anyone. The central case of authority is for Raz the authority 
over persons. See: J. Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 20–21.
28 Idem, Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, 1999, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.001.0001, p. 15.
29 H.M. Hurd, Moral Combat, Cambridge University Press, 1999, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511896880, pp. 62–63. The literature on the authority of other persons and their opinions 
over oneself and his opinions varies significantly when it comes to naming the kind of authority that 
the authors analyse. Heidi Hurd takes epistemic authority to be a general term that includes advisory 
authority, influential authority and theoretical authority (ibidem, p. 63). Richard Foley tends to call this 
kind of authority intellectual authority (see: R. Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923, p. 83). Raz is inclined to call 
it theoretical authority (see: J. Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 12; idem, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford 
University Press, 1988, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001, p. 29), and Zagzebski uses 
the term epistemic authority (L.T. Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, Oxford University Press, 2012).
30 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 53. One kind of “authority” that is often mentioned but won’t 
be a topic in this paper is called “persuasive authority”. In a paper from 1987 H. Patrick Glenu notes 
that the concept lacks formal definition (see: H.P. Glenu, op. cit., p. 264), but still states somewhat meta- 
phorically that it is “the authority which attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it” (ibidem, p. 263). 
Glenu’s primary motive behind this “definition” of persuasive authority is to analyse the sources of law 
and to contrast sources of law that poses persuasive authority to those that have binding authority. But 
persuasive authority obviously has a problem. If an authority is conceptually characterized by the fact 
that it purports to provide content independent reasons for action, persuasion in this sense can never 
really be authoritative. A partial solution to this problem is proposed by Oran Doyle who claims that 
persuasive authority is essentially a theoretical authority. See: O. Doyle, Constitutional Cases, Foreign 
Law and Theoretical Authority, “Global Constitutionalism” 2016, Vol. 5(1), p. 90.
31 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 8; L. Green, The Authority of the State, Oxford University 
Press, 1988, p. 27. Even though there is significant agreement in legal literature on this subject, the 
exact differences between theoretical and practical authority are not uncontroversial. Heidi Hurd 
believes that all kinds of epistemic authority function evidentially, they give us “reasons to think 
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3. Practical authority of precedents
In order to explain both epistemic and practical authority, we thus have to dive 
into an analysis of reasons, for our reasoning is determined by the kinds of reasons 
that utterances of authorities give rise to. Practical authorities issue orders and orders 
are qualitatively different from both advise and requests. The idea behind an order 
issued by an authority is not to simply impact the balance of reasons by giving 
us weighty reasons for action but to give us a reason that excludes the first-order 
reasons for acting contrary to the order32. In order to understand practical authority 
issuing orders we, thus, have to employ not just the idea of first-order reasons but 
also the idea of second-order reasons. The role of second-order reasons in practical 
reasoning can either be a reason to act on first-order reasons (positive second-order 
reasons) or a reason not to act on first-order reasons (negative second-order reasons 
or exclusionary reasons)33. A combination of first order reasons and second order 
exclusionary reasons is called by J. Raz a protected reason. The ability to give 
rise or to change protected reasons is normative power, and practical authority is 
one kind of normative power. In the most general sense, we could therefore say 
that someone or something has practical authority iff its utterances are protected 
reasons for action34.
This helps us to clarify the authority of precedents in various legal systems. 
Judicial reasoning in common law countries is in great part based on adjudicative 
precedents. A previous judicial decision is considered to be a formal source of law, 
and the norms that have been established by the source of law have the status of 
that there are other reasons to act as recommended” (see: H.M. Hurd, op. cit., p. 63). What follows 
is that the utterances of an epistemic authority are content dependent reasons for action, or, more 
rigorously formulated: “X has epistemic authority for Y if and only if, as a result of X’s stating that Y 
ought to do act A, Y has a reason to believe that the balance of (content-dependent) reasons dictates 
that Y ought to do A”. On this account, an utterance of an epistemic authority merely makes more 
probable that we should act in accordance accordingly, since it only points us to other antecedent 
reasons to act in a certain manner. This applies of course only on deontic propositions, and not on 
beliefs in general, and may be sound in situations in which an epistemic authority utters deontic 
propositions. Still, even in those cases it is not clear what makes a person who tells us what to do an 
authority, even an epistemic authority, if he doesn’t give us new reasons for belief, and the reasons 
for belief that he gives us are content dependent. If we can call something or someone an authority 
it seems necessary that it’s utterances are authoritative in virtue of their source and not in virtue of 
their content. Influential authority and practical authority would, in this line of thought, provide for 
new reasons to act. Those reasons would be content independent. See: ibidem, p. 65. While it could 
be that theoretical authorities can give us content dependent reasons for action by giving us content 
independent reasons for belief, this is certainly not a core feature of epistemic authorities.
32 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 18.
33 Heidi Hurd notices that it is pretty hard to come up with every day examples in which someone 
gives us exclusionary reasons for action. See: H.M. Hurd, op. cit., pp. 73–75.
34 J. Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 29.
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practical authority. This basically means that precedents are protected reasons for 
action – they give a reason to decide in accordance with the precedent (or a rule 
exemplified by the precedent) and exclude the first-order reasons that we might have 
for deciding in another way35. The status of precedents as protected reasons for action 
in civil-law systems is determined by the regulation of their status in main sources 
of law – namely statutes and the constitution. So, if precedents are formal sources 
of law, their authority is of a practical kind – they give judges protected reasons for 
action. Both precedents of interpretation and precedents of solution can be formally 
binding in civil-law systems – interpretative decisions, as well as decisions of a case, 
can be explicitly legislated as sources of law within a legal system, or they can be 
considered binding under a rule of recognition by the courts. As such they could give 
legal officials, mainly judges, protected reasons for action – a reason to decide a case 
in a certain way, or a reason to ascribe a specific meaning to a legal text regardless of 
other reasons that they might have for deciding the case in a different way. Further-
more, these reasons for action are specifically legal – judges and officials in general 
are expected to ascribe a meaning because the meaning has been prescribed by law.
The character of precedents of adjudication and precedents of interpretation 
under the condition of formal bindingness is even here somewhat different. As 
explained in the previous part there is significant debate about what is binding in 
a decision that represents a precedent of solution – is the decision itself binding 
or the rule that the decision was based on. When it comes to precedents of inter-
pretation the matter is somewhat simpler. Their role is like the role of definitory 
norms in statutes. Interpretative precedents are ascriptions of meaning that give 
protected reasons to ascribe the same meaning to the legal text. They are protected 
reasons insofar as they are formally binding for the courts. Inquiries into the power 
of precedents in systems with long and stable civil law traditions have concluded 
“the normativity of precedent has evolved as a matter of judicial practice and marks 
the emergence of a new type of accepted legal authority in civil law countries be-
yond constitution, code, statute and administrative regulation or decree, and even 
beyond hierarchical reversibility”36. Let me mention a few examples of interpre-
tative precedents as formal sources of law, derived from recent studies of the role 
of precedents in legal systems in Central and Eastern Europe: The Organic Law 
on Common Courts in Georgia from 2009 states that “legal interpretations (inter-
pretation of a norm) by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court shall be binding 
upon the common courts of all instances”; The Ukrainian Law on the Judiciary and 
the Status of Judges from 2010 prescribes that “the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Ukraine […] is binding for all subjects of authority that apply in their activities 
35 The status of precedents in these cases is they are binding regardless of the judge’s current 
beliefs about the previous decision that acts like a precedent. See: F. Schauer, Precedent, p. 576.
36 N. MacCormick, R. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, p. 533.
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normative legal act that contains the specified legal norm, and for all courts of 
Ukraine”; The Law on Courts of Lithuania in Article 31 mandates that the “state 
and other institutions, as well as other persons, shall apply the interpretations of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions contained in decisions and rulings 
of the Supreme Administrative Court applying the same laws and regulations”37.
All these statutory norms establish precedents of interpretation as formally 
binding. In every one of these case and interpretative decision is a protected reason 
for action in the following simple sense – a court interpreting the law might have 
some first-order reasons to ascribe a meaning to a legal provision, but the ascription 
of meaning to the same provision by the Supreme Court is an exclusionary reason 
for ascribing another meaning to the provision38.
4. Epistemic authority of precedents
It is commonly thought that it is justified, or morally required by principles 
of political legitimacy in contemporary states, to interpret the law in a consistent 
manner. This requirement of uniformity of interpretation is emphasised by legal 
scholarship even in jurisdictions in which the primacy of statutes renders overt 
appeals to precedents, even to interpretative precedents, as unnecessary39. For no 
matter the issue of formal bindingness, “the reasons that judges provide for the 
decisions that they reach […] have directive force”40.
37 The examples are based on the presentation entitled “Case Law of Supreme Courts in Post-So-
viet Legal Systems” given by Nazar Stetsyk on the occasion of the Annual Conference of the Central 
and Eastern European Network of Jurisprudence (CEENJ organized by the University of Latvia on 
September 15–16, 2017).
38 Precedents can also give non-exclusionary prudential reasons for action. In this sense, they 
are binding as a matter of law in civil-law jurisdictions, even if it is not a part of the constitution or 
statutes (see: N. MacCormick, R. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, p. 533). 
The relative position of one judge in relation to the other in a hierarchy, and the position of one court in 
relation to the other, makes many adjudicative and interpretative decisions subject to review. A lower 
court will have prudential reasons follow the decisions of the higher court, when the structure of the 
system of courts allows the higher court to reverse or invalidate the decisions of the lower court. In 
this way, the decisions of higher courts will serve as a model for the reasoning of lower courts, as the 
authoritative position of a higher court is procedurally established. A recent detailed discussion of 
practical authority can be found in: K.E. Himma, Morality and the Nature of Law, Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming 2018.
39 M. Troper, Ch. Grzegorczyk, op. cit., p. 126. Troper mentions some of the arguments that 
make the appeal to interpretative precedents necessary according to French scholars. One is the 
requirement of treating similar cases similarly even in terms of interpretation of relevant statutory 
provisions. The other is the epistemic requirement that if an interpretation of a statute is thought to 
be correct, this cant vary from case to case, but has to apply to future interpretations. Ibidem.
40 N. Duxbury, op. cit., p. 48.
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Interpretative precedents in this sense are a mechanism for correcting some of 
the issues that are necessarily present in the regulation of behaviour with enactments 
containing general language. If general language is inherently indeterminate, and the 
legal system doesn’t contain the means of eliminating the indeterminacy, judicial 
interpretative reasoning will necessarily include previous ascriptions of meaning 
as cornerstones for their reasoning, even without explicit acknowledgment.
Most interpretative precedents, without legal or prudential reasons to follow 
them, will have influence or persuasive force for the subsequent authoritative 
interpreters of legal texts. This practically means that a precedent will give the 
judge a first-order reason to believe that a provision should have the meaning that 
was previously ascribed to it by a court. If the force of the precedent is considered 
simply to be persuasive, then the precedent is weighed with other first-order re-
asons for believing that a different meaning should be ascribed to a provision. For 
example, a court could have reasons to interpret the word ‘family’ to mean “life 
union between two persons that lasts for a longer time”. A previous interpretation 
of another court could say that “family” includes the unions between two persons 
that lasted for a day, as long as there was conclusive evidence that they were plan-
ning to form a lasting union. The interpretation could be persuasive for the other 
courts, in the sense that they would weigh the previous interpretation against all of 
the other reasons for interpreting the word ‘family’ in the same way.
Interpretative precedents are often considered to be epistemically authoritative 
and not only persuasive. Whenever a judge or a group of judges believe that a pro-
vision or part of a provision means what a previous court claimed that it means, 
because a previous court claimed that the provision means that, the previous court 
is treated as an epistemic authority. Let me briefly explain the notion of epistemic 
authority. Our reliance on the opinions of others in many areas of knowledge is 
ubiquitous. We are often inclined to take the opinions of other persons as reasons 
for holding those same opinions, just because they are held by persons that possess 
some qualities that make their opinion trustworthy. We tend to treat the opinions of 
other persons that possess relevant knowledge or skills as reasons for belief. The 
authority of those persons is an epistemic authority41. The most common way of 
thinking about an epistemic authority is to view it as a kind of expertise; we say 
that a practicing lawyer has epistemic authority in the domain of litigation in civil 
41 From the perspective of contemporary epistemology and social epistemology epistemic 
authority could be treated as a subsection of testimony and testimonials based belief. This would 
however depend on the definition of testimonial belief. One of the prominent positions on testimony 
is the claim by Elizabeth Fricker that testimony is connected with telling in general. See: J. Lackey, 
Introduction, [in:] The Epistemology of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey, E. Sosa, Oxford University Press, 
2017, p. 2. The basic characteristics of authority and epistemic authority could be enough to delimitate 
it in the field of testimony in general, as we are not interested in any inquiry into knowledge based 
on what other people tell us, but only insofar as it gives us content independent reasons for belief.
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or criminal suits, or that a medical doctor has epistemic authority when it comes to 
common illnesses42. An expert is a person that is epistemically in a better position 
than the other person to “have, or make a judgement to form a conscious belief” 
regarding something43. Whenever a judge or court forms a belief about meaning 
of a word or provision because of a previous judicial ascription of meaning to the 
same word or provision, the judge or court treats the previous decision-maker as 
an epistemic authority. Interpretative precedents have, therefore, the possibility of 
being not just practically authoritative, but also epistemically authoritative.
Interpretative ascriptions of meaning are often in fact epistemically autho-
ritative even if they are not practically authoritative. If they are considered to 
have epistemic authority they give content independent reasons for belief but 
not for action. In cases in which a judge believes interpretation of another court 
just because it is the interpretation of another court, we say that the previous in-
terpretation has epistemic authority. This is the nature of claims about meaning 
originating not only from other courts but also from legal doctrine, legal science, 
and legal theory and philosophy. There is a further epistemic issue here though. 
A judge could unjustifiably take the ascription of meaning of another court to be 
authoritative, without good reason for doing so. The question in the next part of 
the paper is what are the conditions for an interpretative precedent to have legiti-
mate epistemic authority.
JUSTIFICATION OF REASONING WITH PRECEDENTS
Classical writing on precedent in common-law emphasised the idea that prece-
dential reasoning is a requirement of rationality. Both Edward Coke and Matthew 
Hale wrote about the connection between rationality and coherence in regards of 
precedential reasoning44. A long-standing project of Gerald Postema is to prove 
that precedents, even when they are not formally binding for judges, were thought 
to “exemplify proper legal reasoning”45.
42 Hans-Georg Gadamer devotes most of his discussion about authority to derivative epistemic 
authority and writes: “It is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is ul-
timately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and 
knowledge – the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight 
and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence – i.e., it has priority over one’s own”. See: 
H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, Continuum, 2006, p. 281.
43 E. Fricker, Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy, [in:] The Epistemology of Testimony, 
eds. J. Lackey, E. Sosa, Oxford University Press, 2006, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o-
so/9780199276011.003.0011, p. 233.
44 N. Duxbury, op. cit., pp. 48–49.
45 Ibidem, p. 51.
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Following precedents is commonly thought to be justified for reasons of justi-
ce, which would encompass the necessity of treating like cases alike. The second 
ground for justification is predictability, understood as the possibility of everyone 
to anticipate the decision of the court. The third value is efficiency, since relying on 
precedents can relieve a court from the burden of deliberating endlessly about every 
aspect of the case46. From a moral perspective, and perhaps in a less persuasive 
fashion for the standards of legal thinking, G. Postema argues that precedents are 
based on faith of members of a community in that community and to each other47.
Every one of those arguments has their strengths and weaknesses, and it could 
be argued that reasoning with precedents aids in the realization of these values 
within a legal system48. I will, however, concentrate on the possibility of epistemi-
cally justifying both precedents of solution and precedents of interpretation.
1. Epistemic justification of precedents of solution
The idea that precedents of solution are can be epistemically justified is today 
questioned on the following grounds: it is not enough that precedents give us 
reasons for belief but reasons for action. Epistemic justification is directed at our 
belief that a precedent was the correct solution of a case, and doesn’t do much in 
justify the decision. Deborah Hellman correctly notes “the justification of genuine 
precedential reasoning can be epistemic in nature”49. I’ll confine myself to presen-
ting the epistemic arguments put forward by D. Hellman.
There are, according to D. Hellman, two epistemic arguments that appraise 
the value of precedents within a legal system. The first is procedural: we have 
good reasons to think that a system with stare decisis in place puts the burden of 
giving reasons for departing from precedents on the judge, and it forces the judge 
to step out of his narrow personal perspective50. In this way, a system that intro-
duces some constraint on judges by precedents of solution is more likely to yield 
better decisions. The second argument is substantive and it rests on the claim that 
precedents are not simple decisions, but decisions based on a process of reasoning 
in different time periods, that “yield superior judgement than would the decision 
of any particular person or group today”51.
46 F. Schauer, Precedent, pp. 595–601.
47 G.J. Postema, op. cit., p. 1178.
48 See: A.T. Kronman, op. cit., pp. 1037–1040.
49 D. Hellman, An Epistemic Defence of Precedent, [in] Precedent in the United States Supreme 
Court, ed. Ch.J. Peters, Springer Publishing, 2014, p. 66.
50 Ibidem, p. 71.
51 Ibidem.
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2. Epistemic justification of precedents of interpretation
Just like the basing of decisions of solution on whatever reasons would lead 
to inconsistencies within a legal system, and would be highly inefficient, making 
interpretative decisions without regard for previous interpretative decisions would 
be inconsistent and even wasteful in the sense that every ascription of meaning 
would imply an all things considered decision. But is a court ever rationally justified 
to defer to an interpretation of a court that previously interpreted the provision?
One of the most prominent features of contemporary legal systems is that 
they regulate human behaviour by using general classifying terms. The tools for 
making known the rules and principles containing general classifying terms are 
most commonly statutes52. General classifying terms that are used in statutes are 
in various ways indeterminate. One common mode of reducing the indetermina-
cy are rules, cannons, maxims of interpretation, which are useful insofar as they 
narrow the options in terms of ascribing meaning to the legal text. The amount of 
indeterminacy is nowadays often mitigated by specific rules that prescribe which 
meaning should be ascribed to words in statutes – there has been in recent times 
a proliferation of definitory norms in statutory texts. Precedents of interpretation are 
one way of reducing the indeterminacy of rules communicated by general classify-
ing terms that is related to modes of reasoning that are characteristic for reasoning 
with precedents. Precedents, as a mode of reasoning, are in fact constraining for 
interpretation53, in ways in which statutes are not.
We don’t reach knowledge by personally examining every piece of evidence 
available to man, and by using only our senses and faculties. Most of our beliefs 
are based on the fact that we were, at one point or another told that a proposition 
is correct. If this proposition was uttered by a de facto epistemic authority, we can 
in principle and prima facie, have reasons to believe that the proposition is true 
or correct, even if we don’t really on personally examined reasons. Just consider 
some simple things that we consider as facts, that can only be justifiably believed 
by relying of utterances of epistemic authorities, and in no other way. Such are 
many undocumented things from the first years of our life that were told to us by 
our parents. This prima facie reliance on opinions of other persons in general, 
and epistemic authorities in particular and can be found in all fields of human 
knowledge, even in natural science54. It is enough to ask oneself what are reasons 
to believe that the theory of evolution or general relativity is true. In this sense, it 
52 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 124.
53 N. Duxbury, op. cit., p. 11.
54 A recent paper about the size of Higgs boson was co-authored by 5154 people, see: www.
nature.com/news/physics-paper-sets-record-with-more-than-5-000-authors-1.17567 [access: 
10.02.2018]. For discussions about epistemic dependence and epistemic authority in science see: 
J. Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, “The Journal of Philosophy” 1985, Vol. 82(7), DOI: https://doi.
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can be claimed that “continuity with the past”, which reasoning with precedents 
instantiates, “is not a duty, it is only a necessity”55.
Moving to the field of legal interpretation and adjudication, legally authoritative 
meanings of legal texts are for all intents and purposes significantly dependent on 
beliefs of judges within a legal system. Those shared beliefs are formed within 
a community of lawyers. The relation between members of this community are 
often not the relations of epistemic peers. The complexity of contemporary legal 
systems doesn’t allow for specialised knowledge in every single field of law. This 
is even acknowledged formally in all of the cases in which courts summon experts 
in a field of legal study, rely on interpretations of courts on the international level 
or courts from other jurisdictions, invoke commentaries of statutes and codes to 
justify their interpretations etc. In all of these cases, the relevant subjects are treated 
as epistemic authorities by the courts.
The authority of interpretative precedents over belief is thus a special case of 
epistemic authority. A court adjudicating an issue related to any general classifying 
term that allows for multiple ascriptions of meaning has good epistemic reasons 
to ascribe the meaning that was ascribed in the previous decisions for those in-
terpretations are based on a countless number of cases. The general formula of 
justified deference to interpretative precedents could, therefore, be formulated 
in the following way: whenever a court that interpreted the provision has more 
knowledge, experience or practice in interpretation of statutory texts it is prima 
facie epistemically justified to defer to the interpretative ascription of that court.
CONCLUSIONS
Civil-law courts use previous judicial decisions as models in their reasoning. 
The previous judicial decisions that serve as a model for future decisions are pre-
cedents. Precedents play a significant role not only and not exclusively in deciding 
future cases but also in interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions. In other 
words, precedents do not serve as models when reaching a decision about a case, 
but also when reaching a decision about the meaning of a provision. In systems in 
which precedents of solution or precedents of interpretation are formal sources of 
law, they are treated as having practical authority, giving courts content-independent 
reasons for action. In systems in which precedents of interpretation are not formal 
sources of law, they can be treated as having epistemic authority, giving judges 
content-independent reasons to believe that a previous interpretation is correct.
org/10.2307/2026523, pp. 334–349; idem, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, “The Journal of Philos-
ophy” 1991, Vol. 88(12), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2027007, pp. 692–708.
55 O.W. Holmes, The Collected Legal Papers, Courier Corporation, 2012, p. 139.
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Since legal knowledge based on testimony and epistemic authority permeate 
in our interpretations of law, without earlier judicial interpretations it is difficult 
to imagine a functioning legal system reliant entirely on legislative action, at least 
if legislative action consists of enacting general legal provisions. Insofar as we 
agree that general rules do not fully determine the entirety of reasonable outcomes 
of adjudicating according to those rules, we are, it seems to me, compelled to say 
that without epistemic authority of precedents we cannot have a legal system that 
functions in a manner that is predictable to those who are subject to it. Treating 
interpretative precedents as having epistemic authority is rationally justified under 
the condition that the precedent was set by a judge or court with more knowledge, 
experience or practice in the interpretation of the relevant provision.
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STRESZCZENIE
W artykule omówiono teoretycznoprawne aspekty wpływu precedensów na praktykę stosowania 
prawa w systemach prawnych należących do kręgu civil law jako modelu przyszłych decyzji praw-
nych. W tym kontekście analizie poddano samo pojęcie precedensu i wskazano różnice pomiędzy 
precedensem decyzyjnym i interpretacyjnym. Na gruncie tych ustaleń prowadzone są rozważania 
dotyczące źródeł „autorytetu” precedensu oraz podstaw i sposobu jego wpływu na późniejsze orzecze-
nia. W efekcie prowadzi to do wyodrębnienia i dostrzeżenia specyfiki praktycznego i epistemicznego 
ujęcia oraz uzasadnienia autorytetu precedensu.
Słowa kluczowe: precedens; autorytet precedensu; praktyka precedensowa
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